Abstract. We show the existence of the Braess paradox for a traffic network with nonlinear dynamics described by the Lighthill-Whitham-Richards model for traffic flow. Furthermore, we show how one can employ control theory to avoid the paradox. The paper offers a general framework applicable to time-independent, uncongested flow on networks. These ideas are illustrated through examples.
Introduction
Consider the following scenario: We have a simple network consisting of two routes connecting A to B, see Assuming that initially m = 4000 vehicles start from A, we find a travel time of 65 along each of the two routes. Add a road e as given in Figure 2 , and assume that the travel time is zero along this road. Drivers will start using the new road, reducing their travel time from 65 to 40. However, as more and more drivers use the new road, their travel time will increase to 80. Now, no driver will have an incentive to use the old roads, i.e., avoiding road e, as the travel time along those roads will be 85. Thus all drivers are worse off than before, in spite of having a new road. This is the Braess paradox in a nutshell: Adding a new road to a network may make travel times worse for all. In both cases the equilibrium is a Wardrop A network consisting of three routes α, β, and γ connecting A to B. The route α comprises the roads a and b, the route β comprises the roads c and d and, finally, the route γ consists of the roads a, e, and d.
equilibrium (i.e., all routes used have the same travel time, and all unused routes have longer travel times) as well as a Nash equilibrium. This is the simplest example of the Braess paradox, introduced (with a different example) by Braess in 1968 [3] , see also [18] . This example and some generalizations have been studied in, e.g., [10, 12, 23] . In spite of the unrealistic assumptions in the prevalent example above, the paradox has turned out to be ubiquitous and intrinsic to dynamical networks. The paradox also appears in other situations not modeling traffic flow [24] , see, e.g., [19] for an example involving mesoscopic electron systems, and [7] for an example with mechanical springs. Furthermore, the paradox can be reformulated in the context of game theory. In addition, there are well documented examples of the paradox occurring in real-life traffic situations, e.g., in Seoul [2] and Stuttgart [15, pp. 57-59 ], see also [27] . Not surprisingly, the paradox has been well described also in general media, see, e.g., [16, 1, 25] and on Wikipedia as well as YouTube. The extensive discussion about the Braess paradox makes a complete reference list impossible, see, however, [9, 21, 22] . In this paper we only refer to articles directly related to the research at hand.
Here we want to study the Braess paradox with a more realistic nonlinear dynamics. More specifically, we want to model unidirectional traffic along roads by a macroscopic model where only densities of vehicles are considered. We believe this to be novel. In this class of models, introduced by Lighthill-Whitham [17] and Richards [20] (hereafter denoted the LWR model), vehicles, described by a density ρ rather than individually, drive with a velocity determined by the density alone; higher density yields slower speed while low density lets vehicles approach the speed limit. At a maximum density with bumper-to-bumper vehicles, traffic comes to a halt. The dynamics is well described by the nonlinear partial differential equation
see, e.g., [14, pp. 11-18] . The function q(ρ) = ρv(ρ) is denoted the flux function, or, in the context of traffic flow, the fundamental diagram. It is in general a concave function that equals zero when ρ vanishes and when ρ equals the maximum possible road density. Hyperbolic conservation laws, as equations of the type (1.1) are called, have been used to study traffic on a network, starting with Holden and Risebro [13] , see, e.g., the book by Garavello and Piccoli [11] . Related results on a game theoretic approach to network traffic through the LWR model, see [4, 5] . For general theory concerning hyperbolic conservation laws we refer to [14] . However, the Braess paradox describes an equilibrium situation, and it is not relevant to include time variation. Rather, we want to study stationary solutions where the velocity is a given function of the density of vehicles on the road. At a junction, the differential equation (1.1) will in general, if the two roads have different properties, establish a complicated wave pattern, creating waves that emanate from the junction in both directions. However, in the equilibrium situation, this cannot happen, as it would create time-dependent waves. Thus, we will set up the example in such a way that no waves are created at junctions.
In this paper we analyze the same simple network as described above, but with much more realistic dynamics. More general examples are of course possible using the same methods. However, calculations become more cumbersome and less transparent, and we here focus on presenting the ideas of the model, exemplified on the simple network in Figures 1 and 2 . For another approach to the Braess paradox, see, e.g., [8] .
The prevalence of the Braess paradox is unwanted, and one would like to take measures to prevent its occurrence. In the example in the present paper, we use the velocity of the road e as a control parameter. By properly adjusting the speed limit on road e, one can force the Braess paradox to disappear, and make the social optimum coincide with the Nash equilibrium.
This can be illustrated in the simple example in the beginning of the introduction. Given a "benevolent dictator" who wants to reduce the total travel time and reach the social optimum, a short calculation shows that, with m = 4000, 1750 vehicles should follow each of the routes a & b and c & d, and the remaining 500 vehicles should follow the route a, e, and d. Although a social optimum, this situation is neither a Wardrop nor a Nash equilibrium. This paper offers a framework applicable to general networks. The input is, in addition to the network itself, the length and velocity fields of each road as well as the influx. We assume that traffic is in the uncongested, or free, phase. This will prevent waves from emanating from the junctions.
A dynamic version of the Braess paradox
2.1. Notation and basic definitions. Below, we denote R + = [0, +∞) and
The sphere centered at ϑ with radius r is denoted by B r (ϑ).
Two points A and B are connected through a network of roads. Along each road, traffic is described through the LWR model (1.1). At each junction, the total flow exiting the junction equals the incoming one, so that the total quantity of vehicles is conserved.
The macroscopic description obtained solving (1.1) along each road also provides the full microscopic portrait of the network. Indeed, once ρ = ρ(t, x) is known along the road r connecting, say, the junction at A to that at B, the single vehicle leaving from A at time t o travels along r according to (2.1)
The travel time τ r (t o ) along the road a is then implicitly defined by
To compute τ r (t o ), in general, one has first to provide (1.1) with initial and boundary data, then solve the resulting initial-boundary value problem to obtain ρ = ρ(t, x), use this latter expression to solve the ordinary differential equation (2.1) and finally solve the equation (2.2). Observe that the right-hand side in the ordinary differential equation in (2.1) is in general discontinuous, nevertheless in the present setting it is well-posed, see [6] . In the present stationary framework, this procedure can be pursued explicitly, as we detail below in Example 2.6. Remark that, in a stationary regime, all travel times are independent of the starting time
For the above travel times to be a reliable measure of the network efficiency, it is necessary that they are independent from any particular initial data. Also the standard initial-boundary value problem for (1.1) with zero initial density on the whole network is unsatisfactory, since it would give results that depend on the transient period necessary to fill the network. We are thus bound to select stationary solutions, assigning a constant inflow at A for all times t ∈ R. Moreover, to allow for stationary solutions, we also assume that the total flow incoming at any junction never exceeds the total capacity of the roads exiting that junction.
In the general LWR model (1.1), the flux function q = q(ρ) is a concave function that vanishes at zero density and at ρ M , the maximum density. The flux has a unique maximum for some value ρ m ∈ (0, ρ M ). As usual, we refer to densities below ρ m as the uncongested, or free, phase, and for densities above ρ m as the congested phase. In the remaining part of the paper, to obtain stationary solutions, we need to remain in the free phase only, so that ρ ∈ [0, ρ m ] throughout the network. In order to simplify the notation we will use the normalization ρ m = 1 for all roads. We will not make any assumptions on, or reference to, q above this value. Hence, on the flow function we pose the following assumption:
Clearly, if q satisfies (q), then the speed law v(ρ) = q(ρ)/ρ is well-defined, continuous, strictly positive and weakly decreasing, see Lemma A.1. As a result, the travel along a road segment is a convex and increasing function of the inflow.
Lemma 2.1. Let q satisfy (q) with q ≤ 0 and call ϕ = q(1). Then, the travel time τ (ϑ), which is defined by x τ (ϑ) = B where
, weakly increasing and convex.
The proof follows directly from Lemma A.3.
When γ is a route consisting of the adjacent roads r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , . . ., the travel time τ γ (t o ) along γ is then defined as the sum i τ ri of the travel times of all roads.
A network consists of several routes connecting A to B. To describe it, we enumerate each single road (or edge) and construct the matrix Γ setting Γ ij = 1 the road r i belongs to the route γ j , 0 otherwise.
We now assign a constant total inflow ϕ at A and call ϑ i the fraction of the drivers that reach B along the route γ j . A single road may well belong to more than one route, so that the flow along the road r i is ϕΓ i ϑ = ϕ i Γ ij ϑ j and the travel time along that road results to be τ ri (Γ i ϑ). The total travel time τ i along the ith route is in general a function of all partition parameters, more precisely
From a global point of view, it is natural to evaluate the quality of a network through the mean global travel time 1 T (ϑ) = j ϑ j τ γj (ϑ) or, using matrix notation
We call globally optimal 2 a state ϑ G ∈ S n that minimizes T over S n , i.e., ϑ G = argmin ϑ∈S n T (ϑ). This social optimum state conforms to Wardrop 
The proof is deferred to the Appendix. For brevity, we call relevant those travel times τ i such that ϑ i = 0. Definition 2.3. A stateθ ∈ S n is an equilibrium state if all relevant travel times coincide, i.e., for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}
the common valueτ of the travel times being the equilibrium time.
In other words, at equilibrium all drivers need the same time to go from A to B. A common criterion for optimality goes back to Pareto. Definition 2.4. An equilibrium state ϑ P ∈ S n is a local Pareto point if there exists a positive δ such that for all ϑ ∈ B δ (ϑ P ) ∩ S n if there exists a j such that τ γj (ϑ) < τ γj (ϑ P ), then there exists also a k such that
In other words, no (small) perturbation of a Pareto point may reduce all travel times.
However, from a "selfish" point of view, each driver aims at reducing his/her own travel time. It is then natural to introduce the following definition.
Definition 2.5. An equilibrium state ϑ N ∈ S n is a local Nash point if there exists a positive δ such that for all ε ∈ (0, δ] and all j, k = 1, . . . , n,
where e j is the unit vector directed along the jth axis.
In other words, it is not convenient for ε drivers to change from route k to route j, for any j, k = 1, . . . , n. Example 2.6. Consider the simple case of the network in Figure 3 , and assume that its dynamics is described as follows:
The maximal inflow ϕ at A that, for any ϑ ∈ [0, 1], can be partitioned in ϑ ϕ along a and (1 − ϑ)ϕ along b is min q (1) Finally, the mean global travel time defined at (2.3) is
According to Definition 2.5, we have a unique Nash point at ϑ N and a unique globally optimal state at ϑ G , where
Clearly, ϑ N is also a Pareto point according to Definition 2.4. Note that the globally optimal state may well differ from the Nash optimal one and both depend on the total inflow ϕ, see Figure 4. 2.2. The case of four roads. Consider the network in Figure 1 . The network is given by two routes, denoted α and β, connecting A and B. The route α consists of roads a and b, the route β consists of roads c and d. Roads a and d have the same length and the same fundamental diagram q. Similarly, roads b and c share the same length L and the same flow density relation. Traffic is always assumed to be unidirectional from A to B, and no obstructions, e.g., traffic lights, are encountered at the junctions.
Along each road, the dynamics of traffic is described by the LWR model (1.1) with flux functions that lead to the travel times so that the travel time τ α (ϑ) along the route α and τ β (1 − ϑ) along the route β, are
Then, ϑ → τ α (ϑ) is (weakly) increasing, while ϑ → τ β (1−ϑ) is (weakly) decreasing. Since τ α (1/2) = τ β (1/2), we have that ϑ N = 1/2 is a Nash (and also Pareto) point for this system. It is easy to verify that (ϑ N , ϑ N ) is also globally optimal, since it is the argument that minimizes T (ϑ 1 , ϑ 2 ) over the simplex S 2 .
2.3. The case of five roads. We now introduce a new road in Figure 1 , passing to the network described in Figure 2 . The new road e, which has the direction from a to d, has length˜ and its dynamics is characterized by a flow functioñ q satisfying (q). The presence of the road e allows us to consider the route γ connecting A to B consisting of the roads a, e, and d. For all ϑ 1 , ϑ 2 ∈ [0, 1] such that ϑ 1 +ϑ 2 ≤ 1, we now let the inflow ϑ 1 ϕ enter α, ϑ 2 ϕ enter β and the remaining (1 − ϑ 1 − ϑ 2 ) ϕ enter γ. The travel times along the three routes are then:
The mean global travel time is
The Braess paradox.
We now compare the travel times obtained in the two cases described by Figures 1 and 2 . To this end, observe that the travel times τ 
• ϑ N ≡ (0, 0) is the unique local Nash point for the network with five roads in Figure 2; • the corresponding equilibrium time τ γ (0, 0) is worse than the globally optimal configuration for the network with four roads in Figure 1 .
Under the above conditions we have the occurrence of the Braess paradox.
Observe that the point ϑ P ≡ (1/2, 1/2) is the unique Pareto point for the five roads networks.
Condition (2.6) allows us to construct several examples illustrating the Braess paradox.
Example 2.8. With the notation in Figure 2 , choose Road Length Density Flow
Condition (2.6) then becomes
and, for any ϕ ∈ 0, min{ln 2, V,ṽ} , it can easily be met for suitable V ,ṽ, see Figure 5 .
Control theory for the novel road -or how to cope with the Braess paradox
Our next aim is proving that in the case of the network in Figure 2 , a carefully chosen speed limit imposed on the novel road γ makes the Nash optimal state coincide with the globally optimal one.
We use the same notation as in Section 2.4, but we use the travel timeτ along the e road as control parameter. Equivalently, we impose that the speed along the road γ isṽ, so that
The next theorem says that there exists an optimal control.
Theorem 3.1. Let the travel time τ a , τ b ∈ C 0 ([0, 1]; R + ) be non decreasing and convex, one of the two being strictly convex. Then, there exists a constant travel timeτ ∈ R + such that the network in Figure 2 admits a partition (ϑ * , ϑ * ) which is a Nash optimal state and also globally minimizes the mean global travel time.
Thus, by carefully selecting the travel time, or, equivalently, adjusting the maximum speed, one can avoid the occurrence of the Braess paradox. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium is steered to become globally optimal. Proof. Continuity follows from l'Hôpital's rule. By straightforward computation we find
By the concavity of q, we have
Lemma A.2. Let q satisfy (q). Then, the map ρ : ϑ → ρ(ϑ) defined by q ρ(ϑ) = ϑϕ satisfies: Proof. Existence and regularity of ρ are immediate. Moreover, by (q) and q(ρ(ϑ)) = ϑ ϕ, it follows that
and the latter inequality is strict as soon as q is strictly convex.
Proof. We find
Moreover, using the explicit expressions above,
Observe that f (0) = 0 and
thereby completing the proof.
The assumption that q (ρ) ≤ 0 is sufficient, but not necessary, to obtain convexity of the travel time.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Observe that if f ∈ C 2 (R + ; R) is convex and increasing, then also the map x → x f (x) is convex and increasing. By Lemma A.2, for all i = 1, . . . , m, the map ξ → τ ri (ξ) ξ is convex for ξ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, also the map By (2.6), it is also a Nash point, since τ a (0, 0) = τ β (0, 0) >τ and, by continuity, the same inequality holds in a neighborhood of ϑ N . Assume there exists an other equilibrium pointθ in the interior of S 2 . Then, by symmetry,θ 1 =θ 2 and, by Definition 2.5,
By assumption, the left-hand side above is a strictly increasing function of ϑ 1 , while the right-hand side is weakly decreasing, so that
which contradicts (A.1). To complete the proof of the uniqueness of the Nash points, consider the configuration (0, 1). In this case, the only relevant time is τ α (0, 1) and
proving that (1, 0) is not a Nash point. The case of (0, 1) is entirely analogous. Finally, observe that the globally optimal time for the case of four roads is τ α (1/2, 1/2) = τ b (1/2, 1/2) and the leftmost bound in (2.6) allows to complete the proof. Proof. The travel time T is convex by Proposition 2.2. By symmetry, its minimum is attained at a point (ϑ, ϑ) and if ϑ ∈ (0, 1/2), then this point satisfies ; R + ) be non decreasing and convex, at least one of the two being strictly convex. Then, there exists a map T ∈ C 0 ([0, 1/2]; R + ) such that assigning the travel timeT (ϑ) on road e makes the configuration (ϑ, ϑ) the unique local Nash point in the sense of Definition 2.5.
Proof. Given ϑ ∈ [0, 1/2], we seek aτ such that (ϑ, ϑ) is an equilibrium point. To this aim, we solve τ a (ϑ, ϑ) = τ b (ϑ, ϑ) τ a (ϑ, ϑ) = τ γ (ϑ, ϑ) .
By symmetry consideration, to former equality is certainly satisfied for any ϑ ∈ [0, 1/2]. The latter is equivalent to:
Therefore, we setT
By construction, (ϑ, ϑ) is an equilibrium configuration in the sense of Definition 2.3, once the travel timeτ along the road e is set equal endT (ϑ). When ϑ ∈ (0, 1/2), to prove that (ϑ, ϑ) is a local Nash point, thanks to the present symmetries, it is sufficient to check that for all small ε > 0 we have τ α (ϑ + ε, ϑ) > τ γ (ϑ, ϑ), τ α (ϑ + ε, ϑ − ε) > τ β (ϑ, ϑ), τ γ (ϑ − ε, ϑ) > τ α (ϑ, ϑ), or, equivalently, and call ϑ * a fixed point for Υ. By construction, (ϑ * , ϑ * ) is a local Nash point, onceτ * =T (ϑ * ) is fixed as the travel time along road e.
